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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
Virginia Joanie Goodman, a person
under eighteen years of age.

Case No.
13822

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF

The plaintiff-respondent petitions this Honorable
Court for rehearing in the above entitled case pursuant
to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
the following reasons:
1. In its opinion the Court did not consider the
1969 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 32-5-15 (1953),
which was in effect at the time of appellant's arrest.
2. In its opinion the Court did not consider the
material point that an arrest was being effected when
appellant interfered with the police officer.
3. Under an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-166 (1953), every time a traffic citation is issued,
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2
the driver is under arrest in the technical sense and any
interference is in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305
(Supp. 1973).
Respectfully submitted, .•/.,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I.
THE PETITION IS PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.
This petition is not filed for purposes of rearguing
matters originally presented. It is intended to bring to
the Court's attention an error in its conclusions and a
failure to duly consider a material point in the case. This
is within the scope of criteria established by this Court
for the granting of rehearings in Venard v. Old Hickory,
4 Utah 67, 7 Pac. 408 (1885).
POINT II.
IN ITS OPINION THE COURT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE 1969 AMENDMENT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-5-15, WHICH
WAS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF APPELLANT'S ARREST.
In its opinion in State of Utah, in the interest of
Virginia Joanie Goodman, No. 13822, dated February 4,
1975, the Court stated:
"Section 32-7-15, U. C. A. 1953, is one of the
statutes alleged to have been violated by Joanie.
That statute is in the following language:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Alcoholic beverages shall not be given, sold
or otherwise supplied to any person under the
age of twenty-one years, but this shall not apply
to the supplying of liquor to such person for
medicinal purposes only by the parent or guardian of such person or to the administering of
liquor to such person by a physician in accordance with the provisions of this act.
Evidence of intoxication does not show nor
intend to show a violation of the statute above
set forth. It is quite evident from a reading of
the statute that it deals with an entirely different subject matter. The court nevertheless found
Joanie guilty of violating that provision. The
court was in error in that finding."
The history of the above quoted version of Section
32-7-15 shows that it was enacted by the Legislature of
the State of Utah in Chapter 43, § 128, Laws of Utah
1935, passed March 14, 1935, and in effect March 25,
1935. The section was amended by Chapter 63, § 1, Laws
of Utah 1967, and amended by Chapter 83, § 25, Laws
of Utah 1969. The 1969 amendment was passed February 28, 1969, and went in effect May 13, 1969.
The 1969 amended version of Section 32-7-15 was in
effect when appellant was arrested on November 29,1973,
for the illegal use of an alcoholic beverage. This version
of Section 32-7-15 is found in the 1973 Pocket Supplement, Volume 9, Utah Code Annotated and states:
"No person shall sell or supply alcoholic
beverages to any minor, nor shall any minor
purchase, consume or possess any alcoholic bevDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erage, but this shall not apply to the supplying
of liquor to such person for medicinal purposes
only by the parent or guardian of such person
or to the administering of liquor to such person
by a physician in accordance with the provisions
of this act."
Evidence of intoxication would show a violation of the
1969 amended version of Section 32-7-15, since the statute prohibited any minor from consuming alcoholic beverages.
POINT III.
IN ITS OPINION THE COURT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE MATERIAL POINT THAT
AN ARREST WAS BEING EFFECTED
WHEN APPELLANT INTERFERED WITH
THE POLICE OFFICER.
In its opinion, dated February 4, 1975, the Court
said:
"Even though Joanie interrupted the officer
in his preparation of a citation by entering into
a conversation with him and by calling him inappropriate names, this is insufficient to show
that Joanie intentionally interfered with the officer. The record does not clearly show that the
officer was engaged in making an arrest at the
time. . . ."
The record clearly shows in several places that the
driver of the vehiclej, Linda Lehi, was being arrested when
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the appellant interfered with the police officer. The following dialogue took place at the trial between the arresting officer and the county attorney, Mr. Redd (T. 9):
"Q. And you say you did place her under arrest
for interfering with an officer, and what did you
do with her?
A. She stated that she would not get in the
car, and at this point Ernest Casey stepped between us and put his fists up towards me and
that's when I forcefully arrested him and put
him in the car.
Q. Now at this point were you seeking to arrest or take into detention Linda Lehi, for her
offense?
A. Yes, due to her driving pattern that I had
observed, also the odor of an alcoholic beverage
from her as she sat in the car. I then placed
her under arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol."
When defense counsel, Mr. Swenson, was cross-examining Officer Palmer, the following dialogue occurred
(T. 16):
"Q. 0. K. While Joanie and the other person
were across the highway from your car, did you
notv in fact, inform Linda Lehi that she was under arrest?
A. Either before they left to go over there or
while they were over there, yes."
Additional evidence that an arrest was being effected
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is found in the re-direct examination of Officer Palmer
by the county attorney (T. 21):
"Q. Now, from the time that you had Linda
Lehi in your car, until you arrested Joanie Goodman, were you in the process of arresting Linda
Lehi or processing her arrest?
A. Yes, I was."
POINT IV.
UNDER AN INTERPRETATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-166 (1953), EVERY TIME
A TRAFFICS CITATION IS ISSUED, THE
DRIVER IS UNDER ARREST IN THE
TECHNICAL SENSE, AND ANY INTERFERENCE IS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (SUPP. 1973).
An arrest is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1
(1953), as "the taking of a person into custody in a case
and in the manner authorized by law." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-2 (1953), defines how an arrest is made as follows:
"An arrest is made by an actual restraint
of the person of the defendant or by has admission to the custody of an officer. The defendant
must not be subjected to any more restraint
than is necessary for his arrest and detention."
The California arrest statute contains almost identical language and based on this, the California Supreme
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Court has held that every time a traffic sitation is issued,
the driver is under arrest in the technical sense. In People
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101 Cal. Rptr.
8379 496 P. 2d 1205 (1972), the Court said:
"The detention which results (during the
citation process) is ordinarily brief, and the conditions of restraint are minimal. Nevertheless
the violator is, during the period immediately
preceding his execution of the promise to appear
under arrest. Some courts have been reluctant
to use the term arrest to describe the status
of the traffic violator on the public street waiting
for the officer to write out the citation. The Vecile Code, however, refers to the person awaiting
citation as the 'arrested person.9 Viewing the
situation functionally, the violator is being detained against his will by a police officer, for the
purpose of obtaining lias appearance in connection with a forthcoming prosecution. The violator is not free to depart until he has satisfactorily identified himself and has signed the written promise to appear." 496 P. 2d at 1215. (Emphasis added.)
Although no case law in Utah could be located on
this specific point, it appears that the Utah Legislature
intended the same results as pronounced by the California Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (1958),
governs when a violator of the Motor Vehicles Act must
be brought before a magistrate and it refers to the violator as the arrested person, as does the California Vehicle Code. Section 41-6-166 states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
"Whenever any person is arrested for any
violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor,
the arrested person shall be immediately taken
before a magistrate within the county in which
the offence charged is alleged to have been committed, and who has jurisdiction of such offense
and is nearest of most accessible with reference
to the place where said arrest is made, in any
of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an
immediate apperance before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a
charge of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs.
(3) When the person is arrested upon a
charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident causing death, personal injuries, or damage
to property.
(4) In any other event when the person
arrested refuses to give his written promise to
appear in court as hereinafter provided, or when
in the discretion of the arresting officer, a written promise to appear is insufficient."
The statute indicates that a person who violates the
Motor Vehicle Code shall be arrested, but need not be
detained in most cases if he gives his written promise
to appear in court. For other jurisdictions that have
adopted this definition of arrest see State v. Vaughn, 12
Ariz. App. 442, 471 P. 2d 744 (1970); Williams v. State,
Ind. App., 299 N. E. 2d 882 (1973); People v. Ricketson,
129 IU. App. 2d 365, 264 N. E. 2d 220 (1970).
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Appellant was arrested for violating Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-305 (Supp. 1973), which provides as follows:
"A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
when he intentionally interferes with a person
recognized to be a law enforcement officer seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself
or another regardless of whether there is a legal
basis for the arrest."
The record clearly shows that the appellant interfered with the officer when he was attempting to issue
the citation to Linda Lehi for no driver's license (T. 5,
6) and after he decided to place Linda under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. 9). Therefore, from the time that Officer Palmer stopped the vehicle and determined that the driver was in violation of
the Motor Vehicles Act^ an arrest was technically being
effected and when the officer determined that the driver
was under the influence of alcohol he then placed her
under arrest, in the traditional sense of the term. Any
interference by the appellant from the point the officer
decided to issue a citation is a violation of Section 768-305.
CONCLUSION
The 1969 amended version of Utah Code Ann. §
32-7-15 which forbids minors to consume alcoholic beverages was in effect when appellant was arrested and the
evidence from the record clearly indicates that appellant
violated that statute. There is also testimony from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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record that an arrest was being effected when appellant
interfered with the arresting police officer. In addition,
appellant violated Section 76-8-305, supra, based on the
fact that she interfered with the issuance of a traffic
citation which may be considered an arrest under an
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-166 (1953).
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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